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As the Chinese saying goes, killing the chickens to scare the monkeys, China’s
courts were quick to set examples of people who committed offences in relation to
the country’s response to Covid-19 in order to deter potential offenders. However,
the punishments of ordinary offenders and responsible officials highlight China’s
constitutional setting – the dominance of the Communist Party in state affairs, and
the political role of courts in times of national emergency. This is consistent with
China’s self-proclamation – the centrality of the Communist Party’s leadership
(Constitution art 1) and the division of functions among state organs without
separation of powers. Under such a setting, ordinary people and officials are subject
to different rules and have different fates.
Punishment of Ordinary Offenders
An important aspect in China’s response to the epidemic was the swiftness
to subject offenders who obstructed emergency response efforts to criminal
punishment. The courts served as the enforcement arm of the government and
helped the government to achieve its objectives.
In early February the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate, the Ministry
of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice jointly issued a notice to their lower
level counterparts, requiring “timely and severe” punishment “according to law” of
offenders who obstruct the control of the epidemic. The statement meant that within
the parameter of the law, punishment would be speedy and at the high end of the
scale.
The official Xinhua news agency reported that, by 13 April, courts in China had
dealt with 1946 cases relating to obstruction to epidemic prevention and control, of
which 1196 had been concluded. To guide the application of law and sentencing,
and perhaps to highlight the focus of cases and to achieve a certain degree of
consistency, the Supreme Court chose and published three series of “typical cases”,
26 in total, between 10 March and 15 April. Two main categories of offences are
worth commenting.
The first category involved market regulation on face masks but the offences varied.
A company gouged customers for facemasks and was convicted of illegal operation
of business. That crime applies to three specific types of trading without licence and
“other illegal operation of business seriously disrupting the market” (Criminal Law
art 225). The Court found that the gouging behaviour caused or increased panic
buying, disrupted social order and seriously affected the prevention and control
of the epidemic. It seemed the key issue was not so much about disrupting the
market as about obstructing the epidemic control. The company sold RMB170,000
(about US$24,000) worth of facemasks. After pleading guilty and paying damages
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to purchasers, the company was fined RMB 200,000, and its owner was fined
RMB180,000 and sentenced to eight months imprisonment.
Two offenders who sold RMB98,000 worth of sub-standard face masks were
convicted of sale of sub-standard products and were sentenced to 14 months of
imprisonment and fined RMB100,000. The Court considered the sale to pharmacies
as opposed to consumers an aggravating factor, although the law (Criminal Law art
140) does not allow a discretion of this nature. Two cases involved selling counterfeit
trademarked facemasks. In one case the offender was convicted of selling
commodities carrying counterfeit trademark, while in the other the offenders were
convicted of sale of sub-standard products. This was because the Courts chose the
crime with the more severe punishment in their respective circumstances, applying
an earlier joint decision of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuraterate.
A few offenders fraudulently claimed to be selling face masks and were convicted
of fraud. Article 266 of the Criminal Law prescribes supervision, criminal detention
or imprisonment of no more than three years for those who gained “relatively large
amount” of money, three to 10 years for “large” and over 10 years for “especially
large” amount of money, plus unspecified amount of fines. Two offenders were
sentenced to 10 months imprisonment and a RMB10,000 fine although no victim
had made any payment. One offender was sentenced to 11 years and six months
imprisonment and fined RMB150,000 for his fraudulent gain of RMB930,000.
The Supreme Court chose those cases to signal to lower courts the priority of work
during Covid-19, as the punishment of such offenders was intended to deter similar
activities and helped to ensure access to affordable and quality facemasks which
were much needed in the pandemic.
The second category of typical cases related to the crime of obstructing infectious
disease prevention and control. Article 330 of the Criminal Law criminalises actions
obstructing infectious disease prevention and control causing spread or significant
risk of spread of Category A diseases. The article prescribes four types of behaviour,
and the relevant one in all cases was “refusing to comply with prevention and control
measures established by heath and epidemic control institutions according to the
Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Law” (art 330(4)). 
Except for one case which involved a clinic receiving patients with temperature
without authority, the “obstruction” cases involved people concealing their travel
history when asked by authorities. All were infected with Covid-19, but only in
two cases were their close contacts confirmed of infection, the rest had no other
consequence than causing various numbers of people to be quarantined. Those
people were quickly prosecuted and convicted under art 330.
Covid-19 is classified as a category B disease even though the National Health
Commission has decided to apply Category A prevention and control measures
(which is allowed by the Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Law). As art
330 only applies to Category A diseases, arguably the courts stretched the law a
bit to convict those people. Article 330 offence attracts an imprisonment of up to
three years or criminal detention, and three to seven years of imprisonment for
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offences that caused serious consequences. The art 330 offenders were sentenced
to imprisonments of various length, between six to twelve months, despite the fact
that few people were infected because of their behaviour.
One other case was interesting. As a silly joke, a man falsely claimed to have
coronavirus  and shared the information through Chinese chat channels. The
message reached 2700 people. Within 35 days, he was sentenced to 8 months
imprisonment for fabricating and spreading false information. Article 291(1) of
the Criminal Law criminalises fabrication and distribution of information on an
“epidemic situation” (yiqing) through information networks or on other media
platforms and causing serious disruption to social order. The applicable sentences
are supervision, criminal detention or imprisonment of no more than three years.
There is no definition of yiqing – the term, however, suggests a broad epidemic
situation rather than the personal infection of an infectious diseases. Similarly,
“serious disruption to social order” is not quantified or defined. On the one hand,
the law is flexible enough to catch the man’s silly action. On the other hand, a close
reading of the provision suggests that the conviction and punishment may be out of
proportion.
Through stretching the law and heavy penalties, the courts backed the government
in its epidemic responses. The publication of those cases as typical cases shows the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the convictions and sentences, which would then
serve as a guide for similar cases.   
Accountability of Officials
The enforcement of the law vis-à-vis officials who failed their duties differed
considerably. The Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control Law (ch 8) and the
Emergency Response Law (ch 6) impose responsibilities on local governments
and public health departments in dealing with infectious disease outbreaks and
infectious diseases with unknown reasons, including timely reporting, disclosure and
appropriate responses. Responsible officials who break the rules could be subject to
administrative discipline or criminal penalties.
Hubei and Wuhan governments’ slowness to respond to Covid-19 and to disclose
relevant information to the public has drawn much criticism (for example, see Fang
Fang Wuhan Diary). The World Health Organisation started to get involved as early
as 1 January. The government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
announced the “Serious” Level (the second of three levels) of emergency alert on 4
January because of reports of cases in Wuhan, yet no official alert or warning was
issued regarding Wuhan until 20 January. If anything, the public were reassured
that there was no risk of infection or an outbreak. As a consequence, the general
public was unprepared and many were exposed to the virus, especially as large-
scale official and public gatherings and travels occurred for the upcoming lunar new
year.
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To be sure, Covid-19 was a new disease and there was a process of understanding
it and working out suitable strategies. Western countries missed their opportunities
too. But what was different about China was the action against officials.
In February, the heads of the ruling party (the Communist Party) Committees of
Hubei Province and of Wuhan city were removed from their posts, following the
removal of the head of the Party Committee and the director of the Hubei Public
Health Commission. Interestingly, the provincial governor of Hubei and the mayor of
Wuhan, who were the respective heads of the executive governments of Hubei and
Wuhan, were spared.
This is revealing because it is the executive governments that are – under the
Emergency Response Law 2007 and the Infectious Diseases Prevention and
Control Law 1989 – in charge of carrying out the emergency response, but it was
the local Party leaders that have been sanctioned. This incident is but one example
to illustrate the fact that, despite legal provisions, the ruling Communist Party, not
the executive government, controls the emergency response, as it does other state
affairs. It was a political decision, without proper investigation of responsibilities
under the law. Or in other words, the relevant provisions in law so far have not
been invoked against officials who may have failed their duties in emergency
response and epidemic control. In comparison to the imprisonment of individuals
who obstructed the emergency response efforts, the loss of jobs by officials who
failed their duties was a slight consequence.
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